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Abstract 
 
The outputs presented in part submission of a PhD by publication represent the body of my 
published work over the past ten years. They cover policy, practice and legislative 
developments during both the New Labour and Coalition Governments that have ultimately 
led to the demise of the Probation Service as a unified public sector organisation. Two main 
themes are evident in my writing. The first is a critique of how an ideological commitment to 
economic neo-liberalism and accompanying social conservatism has shaped contemporary 
probation policy and public sector provision more generally. The second significant strand has 
been an exploration of the impact of these developments on the occupational culture and 
working practices of probation work. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and methodology 
 
With its origins in the philanthropic and religious movements of the late-nineteenth century, 
probation offers a fascinating historical and contemporary insight to wider social, economic 
and political thinking. Criminal behaviour similarly provides a prism through which social and 
political elites, the media, local communities and individual victims are able to voice their 
concerns, not just about the nature of crime itself, but what it represents or reflects about society 
and its institutions. In this sense, the work of probation and its rehabilitative role has become 
increasingly politicised and its values contested and challenged. The period covered by this 
submission has, for the probation service been marked by unprecedented change and 
organisational turmoil which has directly challenged its traditional practices and professional 
value base. For this reason, a key strand in my writing has been an attempt to capture these 
changes particularly in relation to those working within the organisation.  My understanding is 
grounded in the insights gained from my work as a probation practitioner and manager, in both 
custodial and community settings. Similarly, my published work is informed by an integrated 
understanding of my work both as a practitioner and as an academic, which has enabled me to 
explore the policy and practice implications from both perspectives.  
 
My association with the probation service spans over thirty years. As a young graduate I was 
employed in a probation office in inner-city Liverpool. The companionship and camaraderie 
of my fellow workers during this period shaped my values and the essence of probation work 
which is located in a belief that professional relationships can be a powerful tool in stimulating 
and supporting positive personal change even if the means of achieving this is contested. This 
is because probation involves interacting with groups of people who can be difficult and are 
regarded by society in general as undeserving of their efforts. My awareness of social inequality 
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and a respect for social diversity was deepened through my training on the Diploma in Social 
Work (CQSW) programme at Liverpool University. It also enabled me to locate my 
understanding of probation work within broader theoretical perspectives. On completing my 
programme of study I worked in a range of probation settings in both prisons and the 
community. During this time I developed an interest in training and staff development and 
eventually returned to Liverpool University as a joint-appointment with Merseyside Probation 
area. Working with the many trainees I had responsibility for, stimulated a long-standing 
interest in the recruitment and training of probation staff and has subsequently formed a strand 
of my academic writing (see Burke 2010, 2011, Millar and Burke 2012).  In my current role 
I have continued to develop my thinking through my academic teaching and research. Since 
2007 I have been editor of Probation Journal. This has placed me in the privileged position of 
being able to directly challenge some of the policy and practice developments that have taken 
place during this period as well as hopefully being a ‘critical friend’ to probation. At times it 
has felt like observing a runaway train as it heads towards an inevitable and potentially 
catastrophic outcome. Despite this, working with a group of extremely supportive and 
insightful board members, some of whom are front-line practitioners, has sustained hope 
against the political excesses of the recent past. 
 
Throughout my career I have been committed to the notion of the reflective practitioner – 
something which I have tried to instil in those I have had responsibility for training and in my 
writing. As a young probation practitioner I was influenced by the quartet of essays written by 
Bill McWilliams (1983; 1985; 1986; 1987) which explored ‘the history of ideas sustaining the 
English probation service since its beginnings in the late nineteenth century’ (McWilliams 
1987:97). Taken together the essays offer a detailed explanation of how the original missionary 
ideal gave way to the diagnostic era which in turn was replaced by pragmatism and 
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managerialism. Some years later I was delighted to be invited to the organising committee of 
the annual lecture at Cambridge University which aims to keep the spirit of Bill’s work alive. 
Bill’s writings opened my eyes to the fact that probation’s contemporary challenges are not 
simply a result of what has been going on in its immediate past but are inextricably tied to the 
choices, tensions and initiatives that have marked out its history since its formation in the early 
twentieth century. Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management (Mair and Burke 2011), 
was an attempt to provide an accessible but rigorous account of the origins and development 
of probation in England and Wales. In my later book, with Steve Collett, Delivering 
Rehabilitation: The politics, governance and control of probation (Burke and Collett 2015), 
we explored in greater detail probation’s recent past from the formation of the National 
Probation Service to the current Transforming Rehabilitation proposals (Ministry of Justice 
2013). Our aim was to: 
 
Capture the middle ground between ideological abstraction, political and theoretical contexts 
for contemporary rehabilitative endeavour and the more painstaking and necessarily detailed 
analysis of the bureaucratic, administrative and policy frameworks within which correctional 
services ply their trade.” (2015.174) 
 
Taken together, these two co-authored works provide the substantive basis for the analysis in 
this submission. In exploring the past I have hoped at least to illuminate and provide a critical 
commentary on the present, in an attempt to capture an ever evolving period in the history of 
an all too often misunderstood and under-appreciated part of the criminal justice system in 
England and Wales, whilst being attentive to the practical realities of working with individuals 
who offend. They are supported by a range of writing drawn from published articles, chapters 
in edited collections, reports and comment pieces. The methodologies employed in my work 
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are almost exclusively qualitative in their  approach however they draw on a range of sources 
and academic literature including policy documents and practice guidelines, first person 
accounts and media representations, in order to do justice to the complexities and nuances of 
probation work. 
 
In the following sections I provide an analysis of how contemporary probation policy and 
practice has been respectively shaped by the New Labour and Coalition governments and 
attempt to locate my own work within these developments. References to those publications 
which form the substantive part of my application are highlighted. 
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Chapter two: Probation and New Labour 
 
The election of a New Labour government in 1997 was seen by many within the probation 
service as marking a potential upturn in its fortunes with the prospect of a more enlightened 
approach to law and order issues replacing the moral paucity that had marked the ‘prison 
works’ dogma of the previous Conservative administration. Lifting New Labour’s election 
slogan, myself and George Mair put it thus, ‘For many and certainly in the probation service, 
there was an expectation that things could only get better’ (Mair and Burke 2012: 159) From 
the outset, the New Labour government set about an ambitious project of public sector reforms. 
According to McLaughlin et al, at the heart of the government’s modernisation programme 
was an ‘emphasis on developing and employing incentives and levers to promote strategic co-
ordination and collaboration via ‘joined-up’ partnerships’ (2001: 307). For the probation 
service this meant a closer alignment with other criminal justice agencies and the government’s 
public protection credentials. Initial attempts to bring the prison and probation service together 
in. Joining Forces to Protect the Public (Home Office 1998) did not muster sufficient support 
during New Labour’s first term (see Wargent 2002:185). Mike Nellis has claimed that the 
desire to merge the probation and prison services pre-dated the modernisation programme of 
the New Labour Government and was in reality a long-held aspiration amongst Home Office 
civil servants, of which the formation of the National Probation Service was merely a 
compromise position bringing Probation under the direct control of the Home Office (Nellis 
2004). Nevertheless, the creation of a National Probation Service could , as myself and George 
Mair pointed out in  Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management, be seen as ‘the 
culmination of 15 years of fragmented initiatives and changes that had tended to point in the 
same overall direction of centralised control’ (Mair and Burke 2012: 164). This was a 
profoundly important development because probation had been, since its beginnings, a local 
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service with a great deal of local autonomy. Admittedly, this had been reduced – slowly and 
indirectly at first and rather more rapidly since the 1980s – but the local nature of probation 
was held up by most probation officers, and certainly by the Association of Chief Officers of 
Probation (ACOP) - whose members probably had most to lose - as one of its defining 
characteristics. Centralisation did have some advantages in terms of potentially providing a 
higher political profile for probation but it also brought into sharp focus the tensions between 
local areas and central government. 
 
The National Probation Service (NPS) came into being in April 2001. Amalgamations meant 
that the previous 54 local services were reduced to 42 local probation areas, which were co-
terminus with police force and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) area boundaries in order to 
facilitate cross-agency work (but not with Youth Offending Teams which were local authority-
based). The NPS as a whole would be led by a national director and would be 100 per cent 
funded by government. Each local probation area was to be governed by a Probation Board 
whose members would have to be approved by the Home Office. As George Mair and myself 
pointed out in Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management, the Boards were, in a sense, 
‘a fig leaf to retain some sense of local input to how area services were run; in fact, Boards had 
very little scope to develop their own policies, essentially they looked after the rowing while 
the National Directorate and the Home Office did the steering’ (Mair and Burke 2012:165). 
With a national director running the National Probation Service, there would be far less 
difficulty in government imposing its wishes on a number of different, ‘independent’ probation 
services, policies could be driven through more effectively, and direct accountability could be 
strengthened. 
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The 2000 Criminal Justice and Court Service also turned the probation service into a fully-
fledged criminal justice agency as it ended probation’s responsibility for family court welfare 
services by hiving off this part of the service’s work into the new Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS). Although civil work had been moving towards the 
margins for some years, it had been part of probation since its beginnings and accounted for 
perhaps 10–15 per cent of all probation work. The names of the three main community orders 
were clumsily changed, as the Prisons–Probation review had suggested: the probation order 
became the community rehabilitation order (CRO); the community service order became the 
community punishment order (CPO); and the combination order, with considerable ingenuity, 
became the community punishment and rehabilitation order (CPRO). A new order was 
introduced by the Act; the exclusion order, whereby an offender could be ordered not to enter 
a certain area for up to 12 months. And a drug abstinence order became another requirement 
that could be added to a CRO or CPRO. By 2001, therefore, there were more than half a dozen 
community penalties with more than 15 separate specified requirements that could be added to 
the CRO or CPRO. In addition, the Act introduced Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels 
(MAPPPs) whereby the police and the probation service had to work together to manage the 
risks posed by sexual and other high-risk offenders. This was another significant step for 
probation; in the past, probation officers and police officers would not have mixed well 
professionally, but MAPPPs seemed to have been a success story (Kemshall et al. 2005) as the 
police came to acknowledge the expertise of probation in risk assessment and conversely 
probation learnt to understand how the police could help keep high-risk offenders in the 
community (see Mawby and Worrall 2011 for a fuller discussion of these developments). 
 
By 2001, then, the NPS was building a new organisation, heavily involved in the development 
of pathfinder programmes that were being evaluated, getting up to speed with DTTOs and 
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MAPPPs, and facing targets that were designed to be demanding with the threat of cuts in 
budget and the loss of government support if successful delivery was not achieved. This 
combination of demands was asking a lot of an organisation that had been under real pressure 
for almost a decade and the NPS struggled. It was clear that workloads were increasing but at 
the local level, it could be argued that staff concern and misgivings about the new arrangements 
also reflected the more structured approaches to work with offenders which was seen as an 
attack on traditional officer autonomy, the threat of privatisation, annual uncertainties about 
local budgets and a burgeoning target culture that increasingly bore down on individual 
practitioners and their managers. Two contradictory features of the new environment were 
apparent. Firstly, of all the criminal justice agencies, the probation service had the largest real 
terms increase in spending (Solomon 2007). Secondly, Probation was still facing an 
overwhelming demand for its services to the extent that the Chief Inspector of Probation talked 
of the system of community punishments silting up probation and suggested that consideration 
should be given to private contractors taking over the supervision of low-risk offenders and 
individuals on community service because the probation service was stretched to capacity 
(HMI Probation 2003). 
 
The National Director - Eithne Wallis - set out her strategy in a document called A New 
Choreography (National Probation Service 2001). It outlined a vision for the probation service 
which emphasised the concepts of justice and protection of the public and recognised 
preventing victimisation as an essential probation task. More specifically, there was a 
commitment  to the development of the What Works or the Evidence-Based Practice initiative 
(Underdown 1998), but this in turn  became caught up in the pursuit of creating local 
enthusiasm for more effective ways of working with offenders whilst working with a treasury 
that would only provide resources for clearly identified outputs. Robinson (2001) captured this 
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dilemma perfectly in her assertion that, ‘The appropriation of ‘what works’ by the centre has 
confused the picture, arguably intensifying both positive and negative correlates of ‘what 
works’: that is, lending weight to the service’s claims of effectiveness; but also introducing 
standardisation on a national level in the form of accredited programmes and the development 
of a national assessment system’ (Robinson 2001: 248).  Like Raynor, this author goes further 
to argue that the what works could also be seen as ‘a powerful catalyst to the creation of a 
national service, arguably completing the process of rendering the service governable by the 
centre and thereby increasing the service’s vulnerability to centrally-imposed changes in the 
ideological purpose of its work’. (Robinson 2001: 248) 
 
OASys (the Offender Assessment System) was a key factor in several developments: first, as 
a national assessment tool it was intimately related to a national service; second, it was intended 
for use by both the prison and probation services, thereby linking both organisations more 
closely; and, third, it was considered important for What Works as accurate, systematic 
assessment of offenders and matching them to appropriate programmes was agreed to be a key 
factor in effective outcomes (see Robinson 1999, 2001, 2002 for a detailed discussion of the 
relationship between What Works and risk/needs assessment). OASys, however, was not rolled 
out electronically to probation areas until 2003 and probation officers were not universally 
happy with it. Using a statistical tool to predict risk of custody had led to some worries; OGRS 
had increased anxieties about loss of autonomy and de-skilling, and OASys –coming on the 
back of so many other developments – was unlikely to be welcomed uncritically. However, a 
survey of probation officers’ views about OASys carried out between March and December 
2004 by George Mair, Stuart Taylor and myself suggested that most probation officers 
recognised it had advantages as well as some disadvantages; on the one hand it was 
comprehensive, detailed, good for risk assessment, and helpful in focusing on factors that might 
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have been overlooked in the past it was also time-consuming, too detailed and too inflexible.  
Our findings were subsequently presented in the article The worst tax form you’ve ever seen’? 
Probation officers’ views about OASys (Mair, Burke and Taylor 2006). 
 
One thing is certain though, that in the creation of a National Probation Service, central 
government assumed control over a set of previously relatively autonomous local area services 
and was intent on pursuing a top-down direction of correctional services, initially in line with 
the What Works initiative, but increasingly aligned to its desire to create an integrated local 
approach to crime and antisocial behaviour through the state. The central drive from the 
National Probation Division (NPD) reflected the burgeoning target culture of New Labour and 
in combination with the control of local governance arrangements, probation practitioners 
became increasing directed in terms of their practice, senior managers constrained by fear of 
withdrawal of budget and heavy handed interventions from a highly critical centre. By the time 
New Labour lost power, there was the most all-encompassing and rigid regulatory framework 
of targets, priorities, inspections, audit and governance arrangements which were squeezing 
the life out of probation. The situation was captured superbly in the publication by the 
Probation Association of Hitting the Target, missing the Point (Probation Association 2011). 
 
Having undergone a wide-ranging, rapid and complex reorganisation in its first three years, the 
probation service was again faced with further transformation as Patrick Carter, at the behest 
of the Number 10 Policy Unit, began undertaking a review of correctional services. This 
culminated in Managing Offenders, Reducing Crime: A New Approach (Carter 2003). The 
Carter Report and the immediate Home Office response (2004) reflected a belief that if the 
recommendations to reduce prison numbers and re-offending were carried out, the prison 
population would rise to 80,000 (instead of the previously projected 93,000) by 2009 and the 
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numbers of those under community supervision might rise to 240,000 (instead of 300,000). 
This was of course dependent upon a change in sentencing practice initiated by the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council. Carter argued that both prison and probation were dealing with far too 
many low level offenders. Sentencing had to be targeted more effectively so that probation 
would deal with more of those who were currently being sentenced to short terms of 
imprisonment, and fines would deal with those who currently were receiving community 
penalties. Thus, diversion from prosecution should be encouraged (again), day fines should be 
introduced (again), community sentences should be more demanding (a perennial 
recommendation), electronic monitoring should be used more widely, persistent offenders 
should be both punished and helped more, and prison should be reserved for the most serious 
offenders (again). None of these recommendations was novel, but the report’s insistence upon 
effective end-to-end management of offenders and the inefficiencies of having two different 
organisations dealing with offenders, led to the first of its two radical proposals: ‘The 
establishment of a National Offender Management Service – replacing the Prison and 
Probation Services, with a single Chief Executive, accountable to Ministers for punishing 
offenders and reducing re-offending’ (Carter 2003: 43). The introduction of NOMS came just 
three years after the creation of the National Probation Service – under the provisions of the 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act - with little time for the new organisation to bed in 
and ‘propelling change weary staff through yet another high speed restructuring’ (Singh Bhui, 
2004: 99). In From Probation to the National Probation Service: Issues of Contestability, 
Culture and Community Involvement (Burke 2005) I questioned the timing of the change given 
the considerable costs in terms of public expenditure that had been invested in the re-structuring 
of the probation service and the roll-out of accredited programmes. With hindsight, it is clear 
that this had been on the cards for at least a few years – having been floated in Joining Forces 
to Protect the Public (Home Office 1998) – but it was surprising that it had happened so soon 
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after the restructuring of probation into a national service only a couple of years earlier. The 
NPS had been given little chance to settle down and be fully evaluated, but its time was running 
out. 
 
On the one hand, it is not difficult to understand the logic of incorporating the probation service 
into the National Offender Management Service as prisons and probation work together 
effectively as a single organisation in both Norway and Sweden (Ploeg, and Sandlie 2011). 
However, Patrick Carter’s (2003) report proposing the introduction of NOMS was somewhat 
vague on detail, and was accepted, and acted upon, remarkably quickly by government. In 
From Probation to the National probation Service: Issues of Contestability, Culture and 
Community Involvement (Burke 2005), I warned that there had been ‘scant recognition that the 
introduction of NOMS brings together two complex organisations with their own traditions 
and cultures, which will not easily (or for that matter should be) subsumed by organisational 
change alone’ (p.17). Since then NOMS has gone through various structural changes which 
have weakened the position of probation. Given the much larger size of the prison service, 
probation was always going to have to struggle to make sure its voice was heard in NOMS and 
with the overwhelming dominance of prison staff at senior management levels it looks as if the 
struggle may have been lost. 
 
 
Carter also believed that the quality of interventions would be improved by introducing an 
element of commercial competition –what he called contestability – which would allow other 
public sector, private or voluntary agencies to bid against prisons and probation for contracts 
to replace them. Contestability was seen as having the potential to bring both positive outcomes 
in terms of increased innovation and diversity in service delivery. In this respect the proposals 
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contained within the Carter Report can be seen as the incisive application of New Public Sector 
Management into the world of probation. In From Probation to the National probation Service: 
Issues of Contestability, Culture and Community Involvement (Burke 2005) I argued that 
contestability was problematic on a number of levels. Firstly, there was the potential tension 
between the statutory responsibilities of enforcement and compliance for Third Sector 
organisations that had developed within a framework of voluntarism and consensual 
engagement. Secondly, that the commissioning and purchasing of services would potentially 
add layers of bureaucracy and expense and lead to more diffuse systems of accountability at 
the local level. Thirdly, that considerable care should be exercised to ensure that contestability 
did not lead to fragmentation of service delivery and the skills that underpin it in the 
community. Finally I argued that that these developments would ultimately drive down costs 
to a level that, while meeting short-term goals, produces services of a lesser quality. 
 
Despite considerable unease amongst sentencers, prison and probation staff, criminal justice 
commentators and a variety of politicians towards what was viewed as poorly communicated 
and insufficiently developed plans for the creation of a correctional service in England and 
Wales (Oldfield and Grimshaw, 2008), the recommendations contained within the Carter 
Report were accepted almost immediately by the government without consultation with the 
main stakeholders. As Rumgay has reflected: 
Carter reduced the accumulation, over nearly a century, of expertise in meeting increasingly 
complex, legislative obligations to a few lines that seemingly dispensed with all tiers of 
management, supervision and support. (2005: 207) 
 
In From Probation to the National offender Management Service: Issues of Contestability, 
Culture and Community Involvement (Burke 2005) I also examined the wider impact of these 
changes and argued that whatever form the new organisation was to eventually take, it was 
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essential to retain its local links. I highlighted that an acknowledgment of the role played at the 
local level by probation through its involvement in Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) and 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships was one of the most striking omissions in both the 
Carter Report and the earlier consultation document. 
 
Two somewhat contradictory strands can be observed in these developments. On the one hand 
there was a form of re-privatisation through the promotion of probation partnerships with the 
voluntary sector and on the other a de-privatisation through aligning it with the other statutory 
criminal justice organisations such as the police and prison services (Fitzgibbon and Lea 2014). 
This latter trend (with an emphasis on achieving the organisational goals of delivering effective 
criminal justice interventions, risk assessment and public protection) was perhaps most 
symbolised by the break with social work training. In my article, published in a Romanian 
social work journal (Burke 2010) I argued that this radical shift in the training of probation 
officers was significant in both its intentions (to move the probation service from its traditional 
social work ethos) and its structure (an integrated award combining an undergraduate degree 
with a practice-based NVQ delivered over two years). The changes were, certainly in policy 
terms, also driven by a perceived need to toughen up the probation service in order to enhance 
its credibility with the general public and were based on a notion that the service had somehow 
been contaminated by radical forms of social work in the 1970s and 1980s. However as I 
pointed out ‘In truth, such notions were based on a false dichotomy that characterised the social 
work role as one of caring and helping and probation of one of control – thereby ignoring the 
co-existence of humanitarianism and disciplinary concerns of both’ (Burke 2010:40). 
 
In 2005, following the publication of Restructuring Probation to Reduce Re-offending (Home 
Office, 2005) I published a response piece in Prison Service Journal entitled Restructuring 
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Probation to Reduce Re-Offending: Modernisation through Marketisation? (Burke 2005b) in 
which I contended that the government’s plans could potentially lead to a less cohesive system 
of offender management and supervision. In this short paper I began to explore a number of 
tensions that I believed were particularly pertinent to this development; themes which I have 
subsequently returned to and developed in my more recent writing. These were, the tension 
between ‘increased central control or devolution?’, ‘What Works or what is politically 
expedient?’ and ‘authoritarian management as oppose to professional responsibility?’ In this 
respect, I concluded that the government’s plans to restructure the National Probation Service 
had to be understood within a wider policy context of economic rationalism and the 
marketization of public sector services. A theme which I subsequently developed more fully in 
the text Delivering Rehabilitation: the politics, governance and culture of probation’ (Burke 
and Collett 2015). 
 
Mike Nellis has argued that the developments I have outlined here are indicative of the changed 
status of the probation service in that it had now become an object rather than a partner in 
policy development. Commenting on the haste with which the proposals contained within the 
Carter Report were being taken forward, Peter Raynor suggested that it “arose from a perceived 
political need for another eye-catching ‘big idea’ in criminal justice to maintain the 
government’s stance of activism in relation to crime” (Raynor 2004: 322). In my editorial is 
anybody listening? (Burke 2007), I warned that NOMS ‘top down’ approach to policy 
implementation was stifling front-line innovation and damaging morale amongst the 
workforce. 
 
At the same time as the Carter Report was published, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003) 
received royal assent. A new Community Order had been devised with 12 possible 
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requirements for sentencers to select from. Despite criticisms that the provisions replaced 
proportionality with a “smorgasbord” approach to sentencing aims (Von Hirsch and Roberts 
cited in Easton & Piper 2005: 89), subsequent research indicated that in reality the new 
Community Order has been used pretty much like the community sentences it replaced and in 
this respect had little diversionary impact on the use of short custodial sentences (Mair, Cross 
and Taylor, 2007, Mair and Mills, 2009). The CJA 2003 also introduced the term ‘dangerous 
offenders’ into legislation within the context of establishing a new sentencing framework based 
upon public protection. The Act also made it easier to recall prisoners and lengthened the 
licence period for most offenders, ultimately increasing the prison population. 
 
The government also instigated two reviews into the sentencing process in response to what it 
perceived as a lack of public confidence. The first by Sir Robin Auld was charged with 
reviewing the criminal courts system and looked at various ways in which efficiency might be 
improved (Auld 2001). Auld proposed a unified criminal courts system, in three divisions, to 
replace magistrates’ and Crown courts although the recommendation to create a new 
intermediate court tier was not adopted in the ensuing White Paper. The second report was 
written by a senior civil servant, John Halliday (Home Office 2001), and entailed a wide-
ranging review of sentencing policy. Making Punishments Work: Report of a Review of the 
Sentencing Framework for England and Wales, argued for a clearer but also more flexible 
framework for sentencing so that rehabilitation and reparation could play a larger role. The 
Halliday report drew particular attention to the lack of post-release support for short-term 
prisoners, which as a result of the introduction of Automatic Unconditional Release (AUR) 
meant prisoners serving less than 12 months were released without any form of statutory post–
release supervision. He recommended prison sentences under 12 months should be replaced by 
a new sentence of custody plus, whereby a short period in custody would be followed by a 
24 
 
much longer period under probation supervision. In An evaluation of service provision for 
short-term and remand prisoners with drug problems (Burke, Mair and Ragonese 2006) 
myself and my co-authors highlighted the particular challenges of working with short-term and 
remand prisoners who have drug problems. Drawing on a funded research project we had 
undertaken we discussed the complexities associated with partnership working and the 
difficulties of bridging the prison/community divide. For many of the prisoners interviewed in 
our study, drug taking was symptomatic of other problems within their lifestyles. We argued 
that this required a more coordinated approach between the National Probation service, 
accommodation suppliers and educational and training providers which was being made more 
difficult to achieve given the competition, rivalries, different approaches and public/private 
tensions in this area. 
 
In December 2007, Patrick (by then Lord) Carter published his second review of criminal 
justice on behalf of the government – Securing the Future: Proposals for the Efficient and 
Sustainable Use of Custody in England and Wales (Carter 2007). In my editorial Can we build 
our way out of the prison crisis (Burke 2008) I questioned the wisdom of expanding the prison 
estate, through the building of three ‘Titan’ prisons, and criticised the review for prioritising 
economies of scale over the operational difficulties inherent in managing such large institutions 
and ignoring the underlying social, economic and political factors which have led to record 
levels of imprisonment during New Labours first two terms of office. I also warned that 
‘NOMS had become an unwieldy bureaucracy that has added considerable costs to the overall 
supervision and management of offenders’ (p.6). 
 
In January 2008, following a series of organisational restructuring involving the Ministry of 
Justice, NOMS was split between ‘delivery’ and ‘strategy’ with responsibility for the former 
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being assumed by the Director general of  HMPS. In our piece Doing with or doing to – what 
now for the probation service? (Burke and Collett, 2008), published in Criminal Justice 
Matters myself and Steve Collett warned that the probation service as a distinctive voice within 
the criminal justice system was being lost in the name of greater harmonisation with a much 
bigger and politically more powerful prison service. We considered what the future held for 
probation following the restructuring of the Ministry of Justice and identified three key policy 
drivers, ‘moving centre stage’, ‘correctional drift’ and ‘modernisation’ which we believed 
were shaping contemporary probation practice and delivery. Whilst we acknowledged that 
there had been some significant improvements in performance by the probation service under 
New Labour, we argued that this had been at a considerable cost to the organisation. For us the 
way forward for probation lay in it being able to deliver those aspects of criminal justice policy 
that quite rightly should remain centrally shaped and determined – such as broad sentencing, 
offender management, and enforcement, for example – with local responses to local crime that 
are sensitive to local needs and public engagement.  
 
During the first decade of this century, the relationship between New Labour and probation 
turned up close and personal. Our contention in Delivering Rehabilitation: The politics, 
governance and control of probation  (Burke and Collett 2014) was that specific events during 
the height of New Labour’s period in office helped to advance the onslaught on probation as a 
public sector agency and played into the attritional approach to defining rehabilitative services 
within the ideology precepts of New Public Management. Probation services felt let down and 
unsupported, particularly when perceived mistakes in their supervision of dangerous offenders 
were, quite rightly, subjected to intimate scrutiny and review. During early months of 2006, 
the probation service was subjected to ongoing negative media attention following several 
alleged failings. The attacks followed the criticism by the Chief Inspector of the Probation 
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Service following the murder of the Chelsea banker, John Monckton by Damien Hanson and 
Elliot White, both of whom were under statutory supervision at the time of the offences (HM 
Inspectorate of Probation 2006a; 2006b). Vital details about Hanson’s violent personality were 
not included in his parole report and as a result he was not deemed to be a high risk. This led 
to the subsequent suspension and reinstatement of four members of the London Probation Area 
and subsequently an approach to David Scott, then chief officer of Hampshire Probation Area, 
to take over the London service, which he did in 2005. In May 2006 another HM Inspectorate 
of Probation report (2006a) was published, investigating the circumstances surrounding the 
murder of Naomi Bryant by Anthony Rice – a discretionary lifer released after 16 years in 
prison. The then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, was reported as describing the probation 
service as “the dagger at the heart of the criminal justice system undermining public confidence 
in criminal justice as a whole” (Daily Telegraph, 21st March 2006, cited in Allen and Hough 
2007: 566). With the murder of two French students, Laurent Bonomo and Gabriel Ferez in 
June, 2008, London Probation Service (and the wider probation community) braced itself, as 
one of the accused murders was Dano Sonnex, subject to post release probation supervision. 
There were significant failings in the overall management of Sonnex (Hill 2009) but what 
became clear very quickly was that the fallout would be far-reaching and that political 
opportunism would determine how the circumstances of the case would be dealt with at the 
highest level. The events which lead to the resignation of the Chief Officer of London Probation 
Service, David Scott, are outlined in chapter 3 of Delivering Rehabilitation: The politics, 
governance and control of probation (Burke and Collett 2015). This, we contended, was 
indicative of how political duplicity and a wider blame culture had not only undermined the 
probation service’s work with high-risk cases but also underlined the individual personal costs 
borne by those professionals in positions of authority when things go wrong.  In my editorial 
A collective failure? (Burke 2009) I argued that although the Sonnex case was apparently 
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marked by individual errors of judgement (albeit probably in good faith and on available 
evidence), poor communication, and practice that in parts fell short of the required standards, 
I also drew attention to what I saw as; 
 
… the obstinate refusal by the Secretary of State for Justice to accept responsibility for the 
wider funding issues and an environment of continual change and uncertainty faced by 
probation for the past five years has been neither helpful nor provided the principled leadership 
required’ 
(Burke 2009:219). 
 
In her telling account and analysis of social work and probation in the light of cases like Sonnex 
and baby Peter Connelly, Wendy Fitzgibbon comments that political life has declined in quality 
precisely as government by media has risen to become a major driving force (2012: 94). Playing 
to the media and utilising critical incidents to prove political toughness and shift the blame may 
send out messages to the wider public about the intent of a government to tackle crime and 
reform the public sector, but if a reasoned analysis of the weaknesses of policy and the fragility 
of practice in complex environments is ignored, it ultimately puts the public at further risk. In 
my editorial A broken profession or a broken society? (Burke 2009), I warned that caution 
needed to be applied in suggesting that individual acts of cruelty and neglect open a window 
to family life in contemporary society, nor should they lead to the introduction of further ill-
thought out draconian measures in order to appease a perceived punitive public, and certain 
sections of the media: 
 
Deprivation – in all its forms – undoubtedly limits aspirations and undermines the quality of 
life in many localities but no matter how bad or deprived the lives of the perpetrators, there is 
no excuse for cruelty to children and that must be the position society takes. But this all means 
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that, as a society, we should be willing to take more responsibility for children whose lives are 
lived alongside us – or, in an increasingly divided society – parallel to ours. The notion of 
understanding less and condemning more (as John Major put it) has never seemed more 
inappropriate’ (Burke 2009:6). 
 
The triumphalism of the Labour Party victory at the 1997 election was in marked contrast to 
the somewhat dejected figure of Gordon Brown, leaving Downing Street, having failed to reach 
an agreement with the Liberal Democrats that would have secured a fourth term of office. In 
the thirteen years between these two events the impact of ‘New Labour’ upon the Criminal 
Justice System had been profound. During this period New Labour’s approach to law and order 
often vacillated between paternalistic care and greater control and surveillance. For the 
probation service it has meant an unprecedented level of change which has in some respects 
resulted in a greater sense of organizational purpose and operational efficiency but with its 
‘humanistic sensibilities’ (Nellis, 2007) severely undermined and its future in a continuing state 
of uncertainty. The crime control policies of New Labour in its first term were certainly far 
more ambitious than those of the previous Conservative government and initially appeared to 
offer a more enlightened approach to tackling the social and economic causes of crime. In this 
respect, the early optimism felt by the probation service was perhaps justified in that it appeared 
to occupy a central place in the government’s crime control policy – a role matched by 
increased investment and an enshrined separate identity after the rejection of the 
prison/probation review. On the other hand, the ideological and political nostrums for probation 
and the constant requirement to find new structures to deliver neoliberal approaches to public 
sector management made little sense to those who thought probation had delivered everything 
asked of it by successive administrations. 
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Whilst it is possible to identify a particular emphasis in each of New Labour’s three terms in 
office (see Burke and Collett 2010), its overall approach to probation was perhaps best 
captured in James Treadwell’s observation that “The creation of the National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS) can be regarded as the culmination of a move toward meticulous 
regulation of both those within the probation service and the offenders with whom they work” 
(Treadwell 2006: 3). Under this meticulous regulation the probation service increasingly 
became a law enforcement agency to which the offender reported in order for their court 
imposed punishment to be administered. Despite the best efforts of its workforce, probation 
has become increasingly narrow in its focus and removed from the local. 
 
A correctional framework driven by the unseeing requirements of public service modernisation 
encourages technicist and rigid responses to situations rather than real engagement with 
individual offenders, their families and their community networks. Whether its command and 
control or the mechanism of commissioning and contestability, a magic bullet for solving crime 
does not exist. 
(Burke and Collett 2008: 10). 
 
Ultimately, New Labour could not square its desire to control probation from the centre through 
increasingly bureaucratic and perverse performance management ideology with its apparent 
commitment to localism, the development of civil society and the role of the local state in 
tackling both crime and antisocial behaviour. It underestimated the complexity of the criminal 
justice environment which requires a legislative framework of clear and intelligible criminal 
justice provisions to deliver individual justice within an integrated environment of local state 
resources and expertise (Burke and Collett 2015). The initial push to tackle the causes of 
crime was lost within an environment where reducing the use of imprisonment for less serious 
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offenders was sacrificed on the high altar of media driven political expediency and the price 
for this was an ever increasing prison population driven by a myriad of poorly reasoned 
sentencing and enforcement initiatives. Reflecting on new Labour’s record in government in 
my editorial, For better or worse (Burke 2010) I concluded that it had; ‘failed to take advantage 
of a falling crime rate and resorted to populist policies, fuelled by an “out of control” 
performance culture, which have in turn undermined the work of the probation service and led 
to record levels of imprisonment’ (p.228). 
 
People are not things: What new labour has done to Probation (Burke and Collett 2010) was 
written following the defeat of the Labour government in the 2010 General Election. It was an 
attempt to evaluate the changing relationship between probation and New Labour, placing it 
within the context of wider approaches to crime control adopted by the government in each of 
its three terms in office. In our consideration of the previous thirteen years we concluded that 
despite the negative impact on probation of an unrelenting reductionist focus on managerialist 
and technical policy fixes, there were still some grounds for optimism based on the emerging 
insights provided by the literature on desistance (see Burke 2014 for a discussion of these 
developments). Taking a lead from Lord Ramsbotham’s statement in the House of Lords that 
‘people are not things’ we reasserted the notion of probation as a moral enterprise: 
… working with people, developing their personal capacity and enhancing their social capital 
– the resources they can utilize in their own rehabilitation – supported by evidence-based 
interventions is  ultimately a human and moral enterprise. Returning offenders to the status of 
responsible citizens accepted and integrated within their own communities ultimately offers the 
public much greater safety than the expensive incarceration in a burgeoning prison population 
that has been a key motif and consequence of New Labour policies 
(Burke and Collett 2010). 
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Chapter three: Probation and the Coalition Government 
 
Following the election in May 2010, there was a flurry of activity focussed around the notion 
of delivering a rehabilitation revolution. In a short comment piece for the Howard League for 
Penal Reform entitled A revolution or more of the same? Probation’s prospects under the 
coalition government (Burke 2010), I outlined what I saw as the main organisational, 
ideological, legislative and financial challenges facing the in-coming government. The 
appointment of Kenneth Clarke as Justice Secretary suggested a more pragmatic approach to 
penal policy,  however as I noted in my Probation Journal editorial ‘Evolution or revolution’ 
(Burke 2011) it seemed to me  that the Coalition was simply quickening the pace of what New 
Labour had either put in place or aspired to before their electoral defeat. In this respect the 
optimism discussed at the end of the previous chapter may have been somewhat unfounded! 
Kenneth Clarke, as the newly appointed Justice Secretary, inherited the legislative framework 
of the Offender Management Act 2007, which had introduced Probation Trusts and laid the 
basis for the future relationship between the Secretary of State and the 35 trusts. Competition 
was clearly going to be the order of the day and in December 2010, plans for a Rehabilitation 
Revolution were outlined in the form of the Green Paper, Breaking the Cycle (Ministry of 
Justice 2010a) and an accompanying Evidence Report (Ministry of Justice 2010b). The Justice 
Secretary’s oral statement to the Commons talked of bringing forward a revolutionary shift in 
the way rehabilitation is financed and delivered, based on more local and professional 
discretion, fewer targets and less prescription, greater competition and a system of Payment by 
Results (PBR) applied to all providers by 2015.  
 
On the one- hand, the proposals of the in-coming government offered the possibility that there 
would be a different and more constructive approach to the governance of probation, one that 
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promoted a more localised decision-making agenda. As I noted in my editorial, For better or 
worse? (Burke 2010:229); ‘Governments have a tendency to centralize and look for more 
radical change when there are favourable economic conditions and healthy majorities, and 
decentralize and look to more local solutions in adverse economic conditions when the capacity 
for change is limited and there is a need for shared responsibility for the management of scarce 
resources’. However, I found it hard to envisage how reduced wastage alone, or increased 
competition, would be enough without negatively impacting on front-line staff. Commenting 
on these proposals in my editorial, ‘For better or worse’, I cautioned that; 
 
The so called ‘rehabilitation revolution’ whereby the private and voluntary sectors will be paid 
by how many prisoners they rehabilitate looks suspiciously like the ideological imperatives of 
marketization masquerading as economic necessity. The notion that organizations will be paid 
by results assumes a simplistic causal relationship between intervention and outcome that 
ignores the complex social context of many individuals who find themselves within the criminal 
justice system. In reality it could instead lead to an even greater concentration on narrowly 
defined targets and stifle creative work and innovation. 
 
(Burke 2010: 230) 
 
Plans to marketise correctional services were hastened up by the publication of a competition 
strategy (Ministry of Justice 2011). Whilst economic fortunes had been radically transformed 
between the latter days of New Labour and the new government as a result of the 2008 global 
banking crisis, there was also the shroud of David Cameron’s Big Society hanging over the 
early days of the Coalition plans. As we elaborated in chapter five of Delivering Rehabilitation: 
The politics, governance and control of probation (Burke and Collett 2015), the so-called 
Rehabilitation Revolution, far from promoting or supporting Cameron’s vision, instead took 
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advantage of economic circumstances to continue to push further the interests of a neoliberal 
economy. In my editorial A runaway train (Burke 2011), I argued that; ‘It is perverse to talk 
about a “big society” whilst instigating public sector policies that undermine the social fabric 
upon which society is based’ (p110). 
 
In Revolution or evolution?  (Burke 2011), I concluded my analysis of the proposals contained 
within Breaking the cycle, thus: 
 
Overall, there is certainly much to be welcomed in the general approach taken within the Green 
Paper and major opportunities to tackle longstanding issues. An end to the obsession with 
imprisonment, new forms of service delivery, a changed relationship with local government, 
new approaches to public health and a greater commitment to localism all present opportunities 
as well as challenges. However, many of the proposals contained within the Green Paper appear 
at best sketchy and in some cases ill-conceived. Introducing the reforms, making the necessary 
savings and reducing costs at the same time will also undoubtedly place a massive strain on the 
system (p. 7) 
(Burke 2011:7). 
 
Two documents entitled Punishment and Reform – one dealing with Effective Probation 
Services (Ministry of Justice 2012a) and the other Effective Community Sentences (Ministry of 
Justice 2012b) were published as part of the overall Transforming Rehabilitation consultation 
process. Essentially, Effective Probation Services re-emphasised the provisions of the Offender 
Management Act 2007 and asserted that, ‘Competition is seen as a means of raising the quality 
of public services which should be financed by the taxpayer, but delivered by whoever is best 
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suited to do so’ (Ministry of Justice 2012a, p.3). A comprehensive Payment by Results (PBR) 
approach was envisaged for the future and Probation Trusts were to be developed as 
commissioners of services with separate local entities bidding for work in order to create a 
purchaser/provider split. 
 
Taken together these consultations proposed a radical change to the delivery and oversight of 
community sentences. They further promoted the ideologically driven belief that splitting the 
service and outsourcing lower risk offenders (irrespective of the dynamic nature of such risks) 
and other interventions will stimulate the market and encourage the private sector to bid for 
and achieve better results. Although there was some inevitable overlap, the second consultation 
paper, Effective Community Sentences (Ministry of Justice 2012b) aimed to consult on the 
development of existing and future provision envisaged in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Bill (which received royal assent on 1st May 2012). As myself and 
Steve Collett argued in Delivering Rehabilitation: The politics, governance and control of 
probation (Burke and Collett 2015); ‘The consultation document, whilst containing some 
welcome sections on the treatment of women offenders and the development of reparative and 
restorative justice measures, was largely a rehash and reaffirmation of the importance of 
credible community sentences, rigorously enforced to punish offenders as well as to reform 
them’ (p.65). Whilst the paper reiterated the government’s position that community orders were 
not there to replace short-term custody (Ministry of Justice 2012b, para. 20) it reaffirmed a 
belief that they could reduce it if used effectively.  It argued the case for a punitive element in 
every community order, the introduction of intensive community punishments (interestingly 
for those at the cusp of custody), more flexible use of fines and innovations in the deployment 
of electronic monitoring, and the piloting of the alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement 
provided for within the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act.  
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In my editorial, Misunderstanding and misappreciation (Burke 2012), I questioned what I saw 
as a number of dubious assumptions that appeared to underpin the two documents.  Firstly, the 
consultation documents cited unacceptable reoffending rates as the justification for such 
sweeping reforms. It would be hard to argue that reoffending rates are currently unacceptably 
high, with 60 per cent of released prisoners being reconvicted having served under 12 months 
(Ministry of Justice 2013). However, it seems somewhat perverse to blame the probation 
service, and use it as an excuse for further reform, for what is essentially a failure of the prison 
service, especially as this category of prisoner are released without statutory supervision. 
Moreover, according to the Ministry of Justice’s own figures proven reoffending of those 
individuals receiving community orders in 2008 was 8.3 percentage points lower than for those 
who had served prison sentences of 12 months or less, even after controlling for differences in 
terms of offence type, criminal record and other significant characteristics (Ministry of Justice 
2012b:10). Secondly, whilst the consultation paper Punishment and Reform: Effective 
Community Sentences (Ministry of Justice, 2012b) does not seek to replace short prison 
sentences with community penalties it proposes a clear punitive element in every community 
order and the creation of an intensive punitive community disposal for those on the cusp of 
custody. As I argued in my editorial Misunderstanding and misappreciation’, ‘Whilst 
punishment is of course a legitimate and expected response to criminality, by prioritizing the 
infliction of punishment, the proposals threaten to undermine the balance of sentencing 
outcomes and the underlying principles of proportionality and fairness in sentencing’ (Burke 
2012: 198). The rationale for such a move appeared to be based on what was perceived to be a 
lack of confidence in community sentences amongst the general public.  In Bauwens and 
Burke (2014) we considered this ‘search for legitimacy’ in both England and Wales and 
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Belgium and how the legitimation processes of the previous fifteen years had impacted upon 
probation practitioners in both jurisdictions. 
 
The consultation papers further sought to strengthen community orders through the harnessing 
of new location monitoring technologies such as GPS (Global Positioning System) and GSM 
(Global System for Mobile Communications) as a means of monitoring certain requirements 
in relation to exclusion areas, alcohol abstinence, foreign travel and residence. It was envisaged 
that tracking through the use of ‘cyber-tags’ would not only enforce restrictive measures but 
would also be used to develop and reinforce positive behaviour. There is certainly potential for 
such measures where there is a risk of repeat offending in relation to certain types of crime 
such as domestic violence or other predatory types of sexual offending, stalking and harassment 
and it could also be used more frequently during remands. However, current evidence suggests 
that electronic monitoring has at best a neutral effect of reoffending and there was no significant 
difference in compliance levels of electronically monitored curfew orders compared to a 
comparison group serving other community penalties. Moreover, it seems more than a 
coincidence that this unprecedented expansion of electronic monitoring is being planned 
alongside the downgrading of probation as a state-delivered activity in England and Wales 
(Nellis 2014). 
 
One positive aspect of the consultations was that they drew attention to the needs of particular 
groups but the analysis provided was again somewhat undeveloped and the ‘solutions’ 
proposed open to question. As Steve Collett and myself noted in Delivering Rehabilitation: 
The politics, governance and control of probation, ‘Taken together, these two papers, with 17 
and 45 questions, respectively, posed for consultation, had the feel of a vision for the 
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privatisation of punishment and reform that could not answer the practical and policy questions 
that such an ideologically-driven approach raised’ (Burke and Collett 2015: 65). 
 
In a contribution to an edited collection of essays which we entitled The Devil in the detail: 
Community Sentences (Burke and McNeill 2013) Fergus McNeill and myself further 
considered the arguments and proposals contained within the two consultation papers. We 
explored the conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, community sentences 
might serve to ‘stem the flow’ of imprisonment. We argued that the emergence of what we 
termed mass supervision (in the community) represented both opportunities and threats in 
terms of how they could come to be reconfigured and delivered in an increasingly marketised 
environment. Outlining what we saw as the practical and methodological challenges of 
implementing a payment by results model of commission (see also ‘Payment by Results’: Some 
methodological issues and research challenges from the United Kingdom (Burke 2013)) we 
argued that although payment by results may be politically attractive on a superficial level it 
ultimately fails to address the deeper questions of penal politics, values and approaches on 
which progressive reform depends. This led us to explore what alternative narratives might be 
imagined for community sentences? Our contention was that making community orders more 
punitive in a misguided attempt to match the damaging impact of imprisonment, ‘was not only 
misguided but could undermine the legitimacy, without which securing compliance from those 
subject to community sentences, and even ultimately supporting their desistance from crime 
are jeopardised’ (Burke and McNeill 2013: 114). Instead we argued that more attention was 
needed to what sorts of reparation and redemption signals could send to communities that might 
foster support for reintegration. 
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When Kenneth Clarke was replaced by Chris Grayling as Justice Secretary in September 2012, 
it was evident that the pace and ideological intent of the rehabilitation reforms would intensify 
given the formers previous role in overseeing the implementation of a payment by results 
commissioning model whilst he was responsible for the Department for Work and Pensions. 
January 2013 saw the publication of another consultation paper, entitled Transforming 
Rehabilitation: A Revolution in the Way we Manage Offenders (Ministry of Justice 2013a). 
This attracted some 598 responses (Ministry of Justice 2013b) and supposedly shaped the basis 
of the Government’s final position encapsulated in Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy 
for Reform (Ministry of Justice 2013c). In the short time between the two documents and the 
earlier consultations there was a significant change in direction. Rather than holding a central 
role in the commissioning of services, probation would in effect now become a residual public 
sector organisation dealing with the most difficult and dangerous offenders. The remaining 
offenders who constitute about 70 per cent of probation’s workload would be supervised in 
future by private sector organisations, in conjunction with those voluntary sector organisations 
who wish to form commercial alliances. Local Probation Trusts would disappear as services 
were commissioned on the basis of some 21 contract package areas. This simple description, 
of course, does not capture the complex web of relationships and partnerships that exist at the 
local level. These range from those built up over years of informal engagement and 
commissioned activity to meet local needs to partnerships enshrined in law and binding on 
local probation trusts (see chapter 6, Burke and Collett 2015, for a discussion of these 
developments). An initial attempt by the Ministry of Justice to clarify partnership arrangements 
under future structures (2013d) only highlighted the potential for wasteful duplication and the 
danger of blurred accountability and governance that had been the responsibility of the local 
Probation Trusts. 
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The Transforming Rehabilitation document (Ministry of Justice 2013) was short on detail 
regarding how risk would be managed across private and public bodies in a world of multiple 
providers. The government attempted to put a spin on the risks involved in its proposals by 
presenting them as a means of providing a better service to those short term prisoners who 
currently receive no statutory support on release. What was less clear though is how this overall 
increase in workload would be funded with no additional resources envisaged. Similar plans 
had been proposed by the previous New Labour administration but were curtailed on grounds 
of cost (Newburn 2013). In my editorial The rise of the shadow state (Burke 2013), I argued 
that; ‘Ultimately, it is difficult to understand the logic of fragmenting service delivery to the 
majority of those currently subject to statutory supervision under the guise of filling this gap in 
provision’ (p.4). Pointing out that the probation service’s lack of involvement with those 
sentenced to imprisonment of 12 months or less was not the result of a willful neglect by the 
organization but were the outcome of legislative changes brought about by a previous 
Conservative government in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act. Dismantling the probation service 
based on a rationale of unacceptable levels of reoffending amongst a group for which it has no 
statutory responsibility seemed to me to be ‘at best disingenuous and betrays a fundamental 
ignorance of the services work’ (p.4). Moreover, as the Probation Chiefs Association (2013) 
has pointed out, the possibility of introducing national commissioning with multiple contracts 
within a timescale of 18 months was extremely questionable when the competition for 
Community Payback in London had taken over two years, and this of course was restricted to 
a single intervention in a single area. The contracts for running the CRCs will be for between 
eight and ten years and As I noted in my editorial Grayling’s hubris?, this had ‘all the hallmarks 
of a ‘scorched earth’ policy which a subsequent change of government would find difficult to 
untangle even if it were so inclined’ (Burke 2013: 377). 
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The proposals contained in Transforming Rehabilitation were presented to parliament as part 
of the legislative framework of the 2013 Offender Rehabilitation Bill (subsequently proceeding 
to the 2013 Offender Rehabilitation Act). In a short piece for the British Society of Criminology 
(Burke 2013), I outlined my objections to the plans. Whilst I welcomed the focus on improved 
resettlement outcomes through the extension of the licence and supervision requirements for 
short-term prisoners as being long-overdue I contended that the potentially unintended 
consequences of this development had not been fully thought through, or financially accounted 
for, and could in turn have the unintended consequence of increasing the prison population.  
 
In Burke (2015) I concluded that perhaps the ultimate failing of the current proposals is the 
lack of understanding of the complexity of supervision which cannot be reduced to an 
instrumental means of reducing reoffending at the lowest cost. Offenders are presented as a 
homogeneous group, differentiated only by the category of risk assigned, and there is little 
acknowledgment of diversity issues. For example, there is a glaring lack of any specific policies 
for dealing with women offenders despite the Government’s acknowledgement in their 
Transforming Rehabilitation strategy of the widespread support among those consulted that 
services specifically tailored to women offenders’ needs should be further developed and 
delivered. In this respect the government’s proposals contain all the elements of what Loraine 
Gelsthorpe has insightfully described as a ‘curious mix of political posturing, populist 
punitiveness and measures to reduce costs’ (2012). The splitting of responsibilities across a 
myriad of new and untested arrangements threatens continuity of care, fragments delivery, and 
risks the loss of professional expertise. The demise of the probation service in England and 
Wales as an integrated public service has been unedifying and has further widened the distance 
between the community and its offenders in order to maximise profit opportunities for a small 
number of powerful providers. 
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Chapter four: Concluding thoughts 
 
How then do we summarise the developments outlined in this submission? In our conclusion 
to Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management (Mair and Burke 2012) we considered 
the nature of the contemporary changes to probation. Firstly, we contended that they do not 
always represent radical discontinuities with the past.  Secondly, we acknowledged that 
probation has always been subject to change – this is not something that has just begun to 
happen in the last couple of decades, although the scope, speed and depth of change have all 
certainly changed. What is different though has been the way in which change has come about. 
For most of its history, developments in probation were rooted in the practical everyday work 
of the service. Today, change is driven from the top down. In this respect probations’ 
experience is perhaps just another example of what David Marquand (2004) has termed 
‘decline of the public’ which he sums up thus: 
 
The single most important element of the New Right project of the 1980s and 1990s was a 
relentless kulturkampf designed to root out the culture of service and citizenship which had 
become part of the social fabric. De-regulation, privatization, so-called public–private 
partnerships, proxy markets, performance indicators mimicking those of the private corporate 
sector, and a systematic assault on professional autonomy narrowed the public domain and 
blurred the distinction between it and the market domain. 
(Marquand 2004: 2) 
 
Focusing more particularly on criminal justice, David Garland (2001: 6) has famously listed 
12 indices of change that overall characterise the developments that had taken place in crime 
control and criminal justice since the 1970s. In Delivering Rehabilitation; The politics, 
42 
 
governance and control of probation (Burke and Collett 2015) myself and Steve Collett 
considered Garland’s work from a probation perspective. We argued that whilst all the indices 
of change identified remain relevant, we highlighted politicisation, new management styles and 
a perpetual sense of crisis as indicative of New Labour and subsequently the Coalition’s 
approach to offender rehabilitation. We added another – blaming probation – which has come 
to the fore not just in relation to individual failures in supervision, but more insidiously to wider 
social problems and the management of particular groups (see chapter 7).  
 
While the changes that have taken place in probation are undoubtedly part of much wider 
social, economic and cultural shift and must be seen in this context, there is little doubt that 
probation has changed in profoundly important ways. Whether or not social work was the 
appropriate basic qualification for a probation officer, it did provide a solid foundation on 
which to carry out work with offenders. As George Mair and myself argued; ‘Without such a 
foundation, probation has lost a language, a distinct theoretical model (or models) and perhaps 
a justification for its existence. Becoming a fully-fledged criminal justice agency may have 
been necessary, even desirable, but it has left probation rootless’ (Mair and Burke 2012). 
After Michael Howard became Home Secretary any empathy with the probation service or 
understanding of the difficulties it faced disappeared. Probation was an easy target for 
advocates of a punitive approach to crime control and the service was stripped of the assets that 
made it what it was. This has continued under both the New Labour and Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition governments. 
 
It could be argued that it is not so much that the key changes imposed on probation were 
necessarily mistakes in themselves. Probation needed to change and was at times reluctant to 
do so. The problem though was that the full, long-term, cumulative impact of the changes was 
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not thought through. For example, becoming a fully-fledged criminal justice agency may have 
been a sensible development, but having to lose completely its social work foundations meant 
that probation lost its unique nature. There were certainly many problems with having 42 
separate probation areas, but moving to a fully centralised service based in the Home Office 
was not the only solution to these problems. Community penalties in general may have needed 
to be seen as more rigorous, but consistently making the service more punitive was a wasted 
effort as it could never compete with prison in these terms, and it meant the marginalisation of 
rehabilitation which – however difficult it may be to evidence consistently – does work in 
reducing offending, is less harmful to offenders and cheaper than custody. Probation had been 
working successfully with voluntary agencies since its earliest days, and perhaps encouraging 
more and more consistent use was a positive development; to open probation work up to 
competition, however, means not only a myriad of difficulties of regulation, control and 
accountability, but risks thrusting probation into a market-place where it could easily lose its 
way. Finally, closer working with the prison service could only have been beneficial for 
offenders, but the form that NOMS has taken was not necessarily the way to achieve that and 
the many structural changes that have taken place since are, at the very least, suggestive of 
government unease. 
 
As myself and George Mair noted in Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management, ‘At 
best, the probation service – despite the many changes it has come through – still exists and for 
that we should be grateful. At worst, the service has lost its roots, its traditions, its culture, its 
professionalism’ (Mair and Burke 2012). Its political masters seem to have lost faith in its 
abilities and it is about to lose a significant part of its funding as the decisions of the coalition’s 
Spending Review continue to be implemented. Community penalties may well have a future, 
even if it is only as an alternative to custody, but whether this is the case for the probation 
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service is another matter entirely. We cannot escape the reality that it is the ideological 
imperatives of the grand neoliberal economic strategy that has ultimately determined 
Probation’s experience over the recent past. To simply concentrate on the immediate political 
environment, the interplay of party politics, public opinion, electoral success and service 
delivery mechanisms, without considering the wider ideological and political forces at play, 
makes understanding of policy direction and innovation in delivery mechanisms somewhat 
perplexing, particularly when they fly in the face of evidence about what is effective in reducing 
re-offending.   
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Chapter five:  Contribution to knowledge and practice 
 
Attempting to document a period of profound organisational and practice change has been a 
unifying factor in my work. In reflecting upon the development of my writing and research, it 
would seem to be that two main themes emerge. The first of these concerns how the ideological 
commitment to economic neo-liberalism and accompanying social conservatism by successive 
governments has shaped contemporary probation policy and public sector provision more 
generally (see – chapter 5 Delivering Rehabilitation (Burke and Collett 2015). Through my 
writing I have consistently challenged the dominant political consensus that competition is the 
best mechanism to increase innovation and improve efficiency through the allocation of 
resources to where they will have the greatest impact.   On another level though, I would 
contend that this is not just the promotion of competition per se but its use as a mechanism 
towards further reducing the service delivery role of the public sector through the creation of 
commissioning mechanisms and financial structures that promote the influence of the private 
sector. Placed within this context, the changes experienced by the probation service can be 
viewed as part of a much broader project to reform and modernize the whole of the public 
sector or what David Beetham calls ‘the distortion and subversion of the public realm in the 
services of private interests’ (2013:4). The net result of these trends is that, ‘Justice and penal 
services, such as offender supervision in the community, drugs and alcohol programmes, 
electronic monitoring and prison transport, are repackaged as commodities which can be 
auctioned off in the open market. This though is not simply the state adopting a  laissez-faire 
approach to the markets, nor is it a  passive actor in these developments, for as Corcoran 
(2014:56) notes, ‘At the core of this network is the state whose controlling hand slows down, 
speeds up, colludes with or creates the conditions in which penal service markets can flourish’. 
The marketisation of probation services during the coalition government provides a good 
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example of this, for as Garside and Ford note; ‘having first sought to adapt the market to 
existing probation structures, the government found the solution in adapting probation to suit 
the market’ (2015: 23) 
 
The danger here is the potential for an over-reliance of the state on a small but powerful group 
of private multi-national companies. This is because firstly, by definition multinational 
corporations are expansionist (in that they need to obtain maximum profits for their 
shareholders through economies of scale) thereby creating new ‘private monopolies’. In reality, 
only a small caucus of multinationals have the capacity to tender for large-scale government 
contracts and as Zoe Williams (2012) has highlighted, ‘The central problem is that it 
encourages companies to expand into areas in which they have no expertise and squeeze out 
smaller, often charitable enterprises already working in that area’. Moreover, the high profile 
failure of G4S to provide sufficient security for the London 2012 Olympics has also brought 
into question the assumed efficiency of the private sector (Orr, 2012) and reputational and 
quality of practice risks.    
 
As I argued in my editorial Pause for thought? (Burke 2012), all too often contemporary 
politicians promulgate a false dichotomy between the private and the public sectors. Drawing 
on the work of John Richardson (undated), who is an expert in critical discourse analysis, I 
highlighted how private provision is often framed within the positive language of ‘reform, 
cooperation and partnership’. Whereas the public sector is repeatedly co-located with 
‘spending’, the private sector is more likely to be framed as ‘finance’ and ‘increased choice’ 
which could be seen as more positive terms. Whilst these are strong metaphors within which 
to locate political debate, in reality both sectors are of course mutually reliant on each other. 
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The probation service has a long tradition of working alongside other sectors and no one within 
probation would claim that the organization can, or should, provide all the services required to 
meet the complex needs of those supervised. Whilst it may well be that the private sector has 
a role to play in criminal justice in the provision of specific services I have consistently 
questioned what seems to me to be an ‘accepted wisdom’ that private providers will deliver 
efficiency savings as often these are inevitably offset by increased administration and 
bureaucracy.  
 
In my more recent work I have been more concerned with the moral aspects of these 
developments in relation to probation practice. Like many others I have been particularly 
influenced by the work of the American political philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) who has 
argued that we need to think carefully about how markets operate, what the limits of the market 
are, and the need to ensure that whilst the increasing penetration of public services by the 
private sector persists (as it seems invariably it will) that issues of legitimacy and public interest 
are at the forefront of these discussions. He argues that we have drifted from having a market 
economy to being a market society (Sandel, 2012: 10). Whereas the former is a tool for 
organizing productive activity, the latter becomes a way of life in which market values 
encroach into every aspect of public life. Sandel questions the morality of market economies 
that reduce public goods to mere commodities that can be bought and sold to the highest bidder. 
He warns that such a situation not only widens inequalities but ultimately corrupts the values 
of society because ‘markets don’t only allocate goods; they also express and promote certain 
attitudes towards the good being exchanged’ (Sandel, 2012: 8). As I noted in my editorial Pause 
for thought? (Burke 2012) this raises an intriguing question as to the extent in which 
marketization and the profit motive undermine the values that the probation service should 
stand for?  As such I argued that: 
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Policy debates around probation practice cannot and should not be merely limited to 
instrumental means. Supporting and helping individuals towards achieving a better life and 
treating them with humanity is an ethical entitlement and not one contingent upon reducing 
reoffending at the lowest possible cost (Burke 2012:138).  
 
The second significant strand to my work has been an exploration of the impact of these 
developments on the occupational culture and working practices of probation staff. Often 
characterised as interfering, well-intentioned (if somewhat naïve) ‘do-gooders’, probation staff 
have never had, nor sought, the symbolic status of other criminal justice professionals (Mair 
and Burke 2011). As a result the occupational culture within probation has been a largely 
neglected and under-researched area of academic enquiry (Burke and Davies 2011). In my 
editorial, Is anybody listening? (Burke 2007) I argued that; 
 
In the relentless moves to modernise criminal justice, insufficient attention has been given to 
the views of those whose responsibility it is to implement such changes, or indeed to those 
individuals who are subject to them. (p.315). 
 
Probation’s lack of a strong a identity within the public imagination is partly because much of 
its work is undertaken in confidential settings and involves the encouragement of longer term 
change processes in individuals that do not sit easily with demands for quick fixes.  There have 
been attempts to increase the visibility of some community sanctions such as unpaid work 
(Casey, 2008) but still much of it takes place behind closed doors.  Probation staff operate in 
an environment in which ‘rewards can be few and setbacks common (Shapland et al 2014:149) 
and as such the personal qualities required of, and the professional skills deployed by, probation 
staff in their work are often underestimated and unappreciated.  Rob Mawby and Anne Worrall 
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(2013), in their comprehensive analysis of probation’s occupational culture describe probation 
as dirty work, that is, work necessary for society but which does not retain status or public trust. 
Despite this the dominant practice culture within probation has remained remarkably resilient 
even though inevitably it has had to change and adapt to wider policy narratives. The work of 
Mawby and Worrall (2013), and other research studies (Deering 2011, Phillips 2014) have 
consistently alluded to the existence of a strongly developed sense of identity amongst 
probation staff and a high degree of homogeneity in the attitudes and values they hold to their 
work. Moreover, as Bourdieu (1980) has highlighted, how professionals make sense of the 
external environment is often a product of socialization and established practices.  These in 
turn are reflected in what he termed “habitus” to describe the individual’s ‘internal set of 
dispositions that shape perception, appreciation, and action’ (Page 2013: 152).  There is also 
increasing evidence that, ‘offenders (like everyone else) assess and respond to certain moral 
qualities of those that have authority over them’ (McNeill 2009: 6).   
 
Recruitment and training was seen as an important vehicle for bringing about change and 
introducing a new organisational ethos into probation during the 1990s. Between 1997 and 
2003 I was Programme Leader on the BA Diploma in Probation Studies (DiP) which replaced 
the former social work training requirement for probation officers. Drawing on insights gleaned 
from undertaking this role, I became increasingly interested in what I viewed as a move towards 
the ‘codeification’ of practice knowledge and understanding and the separation of knowledge 
of theory and knowledge for practice (Burke 2010). In a later piece (Millar and Burke 2012) 
based on a study of trainee probation officers, a colleague and myself on the DiP programme 
warned that a ‘culture of utility’ was  becoming prevalent in probation practice as a result of 
what we saw as a preoccupation with producing specific outcomes in contemporary probation 
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policy. This, we argued, was unconducive to humanistic practice. Applying the Kantian idea 
of ‘respect for persons’ we argued that: 
 
To pursue humanistic probation involves, first of all, accepting and asserting that, even although 
individuals have acted illegally, they should still be met with respect – and the respectful 
treatment – which is their right as human beings, independently of any humane treatment could 
have on the risk of their reoffending 
(Millar and Burke 2012: 323 
 
Ultimately, my concern with the current direction of the probation service is that in the notion 
of a complex moral endeavour by skilled workers engaging troubled and troublesome 
individuals, on behalf of and accountable to the public, is being lost as a market driven logic 
and modes of organising replaces professional values. Throughout my work I have asserted my 
belief that the concept of rehabilitation is ultimately a moral undertaking because it is about 
what society ought to do, rather than what is currently does, to rehabilitate and reintegrate those 
who offend. In destroying the ethos of probation and the occupational strength of its workers 
through fragmentation and privatisation, this moral narrative and purpose will inevitably be 
undermined. 
 
Given the unrelenting pace and change of the probation landscape it is perhaps unsurprising 
that my work continues to evolve and build on new insights. Recently my work has benefited 
from my involvement in two large scale funded research projects. My involvement in the Cost 
action ‘Supervision in Europe’ has enabled me to broaden the focus of my enquiry beyond the 
borders of England and Wales.  The aim of this action is to ‘review and synthesise existing 
51 
 
knowledge and then enrich it through inter-disciplinary and comparative work and capacity 
building’ (www.offendersupervision.eu). As a result of my involvement in the action I have 
jointly authored a report on offender supervision in England and Wales (Burke and Fitzgibbon 
2013) and contributed to publications in several European countries.  I am also currently 
involved as a co-researcher in an ESRC funded project entitled ‘Devolving Probation Services: 
An ethnographic study of the implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation Agenda (Ref: 
ES/M000028). This project will examine this significant development in one part of the 
country, providing a case study of the 'devolution' of the majority of probation services. It will 
look in detail, in one metropolitan area, at the process and implications of moving the bulk of 
probation work (and staff) from the public probation service to a Community Rehabilitation 
Company with an uncertain future. The project will seek to understand this process from a 
variety of perspectives, including those of senior managers involved in running the company 
and probation workers engaged in supervising offenders. The approach taken of a process-
based ethnographic case study enabled us to observe the ‘becoming’ of the CRC and hear the 
phenomenological accounts of those involved.  
 
The first output from this research project was advanced access published in the British Journal 
of Criminology (Robinson, Burke and Millings 2015). It draws on data collected between 
March 2014 (when the study commenced, and some weeks prior to which Trust staff had 
learned of their allocation to either the NPS or CRC) and the end of October 2014 (when the 
preferred bidders were announced). It was in the middle of this period (1 June 2014) that the 
CRC was officially inaugurated, and so the research has been able to capture both the planning 
and anticipation, and the early months of operation of the CRC. In ‘Phase 1’ (March-May), we 
conducted 30 individual interviews, and in ‘Phase 2’ (June-October), we conducted 29 
individual and focus group interviews with 40 people. In addition we attended around 60 senior 
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management meetings and staff briefings, across both phases. Our sampling strategy has 
included a longitudinal component, such that around half of those interviewed in Phase 2 were 
also interviewed in Phase 1. Our ‘tracker’ sample included all members of the senior 
management team and a range of staff in practitioner, middle management and support roles. 
 
In comparison with other parts of the criminal justice system such as policing (Skinns 2011; 
White 2014), prisons (Ludlow 2014) and Courts (Ward 2015) we argued that although there 
are some similarities between the experiences of workers subject to the involuntary transfer of 
their labour to private sector organisations, there were also important differences. What is novel 
about the probation case is the protracted nature of the change process, and the ‘interstructural’ 
state (Turner 1967) of the new CRCs in which migrating workers have found themselves in the 
first few months of their existence which defy traditional public/private sector demarcations. 
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the key themes to emerge from the 
research has been ‘liminality’ in terms of being caught ‘betwixt and between’ both the old and 
the new organisational arrangements and public and private delivery. Ultimately, we argued 
that: 
 
there are multiple challenges that confront the (d) evolving probation field in England and 
Wales: allowing new owners, and their models of working, time  to bed in, adopting payment 
by results mechanisms and establishing ‘through the gate’ and post-sentence supervision 
structures introduced by the 2014 Offender Rehabilitation Act. But as this snapshot of the views 
of staff at the moment of separation indicates, a not insignificant tension that this specific 
privatization journey needs to grapple with is the ability of criminal justice working cultures to 
adapt, mutate and endure within the private sector’. 
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(Robinson, Burke and Millings, 2015: 16). 
 
This research is further evidence of my commitment to a qualitative approach drawing on my 
insights as a practitioner and academic to obtain a narrative understanding, recognising the 
importance of the individual’s lived experience. In this respect it is hoped that these will 
provide new and emerging insights into what I believe is an enthralling and important aspect 
of public policy. 
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